We consider the mean-field game where each agent determines the optimal time to exit the game by solving an optimal stopping problem with reward function depending on the density of the state processes of agents still present in the game. We place ourselves in the framework of relaxed optimal stopping, which amounts to looking for the optimal occupation measure of the stopper rather than the optimal stopping time. This framework allows us to prove the existence of the relaxed Nash equilibrium and the uniqueness of the associated value of the representative agent under mild assumptions. Further, we prove a rigorous relation between relaxed Nash equilibria and the notion of mixed solutions introduced in earlier works on the subject, and provide a criterion, under which the optimal strategies are pure strategies, that is, behave in a similar way to stopping times. Finally, we present a numerical method for computing the equilibrium in the case of potential games and show its convergence.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study a large-population stochastic differential game of optimal stopping, where each agent finds the optimal time to exit the game by solving an optimal stopping problem with instantaneous reward function depending on the density of the state processes of agents still present in the game. To motivate the mean-field game (MFG) framework, we first provide a formulation with a finite number of agents. Assume that each agent i = 1, 2, ..., n has a private state process X i , whose dynamics is given by the stochastic differential equation (SDE), Agents have the same state process coefficients and objective functions, and the optimal stopping problems are coupled only through the empirical measure m n . Since the objective functions are coupled, it is natural to look for Nash equilibria.
Stochastic differential games with a large number n of players are rarely tractable. The MFG approach amounts to looking for the Nash equilibrium in the limiting regime, when the number of players n goes to infinity. Following this approach, we study the MFG of optimal stopping, which can be seen as an infinite-agent version of the above game. In this approach, we first solve for a fixed distribution m the optimal stopping problem max τ E τ 0 e −ρtf (t, X t , m t )dt + e −ρ(τ ∧T ) g(τ ∧ T, X τ ∧T ) , with dX t = µ(t, X t )dt + σ(t, X t )dW t .
Then, given τ m,x the optimal stopping time for the agent with initial condition x, and the initial measure m 0 , we look for the family of distributions (m t ) 0≤t≤T such that m t (A) = m 0 (dx)P[X A solution (Nash equilibrium) of the MFG problem is the family of measures (m t ) 0≤t≤T , which is the fixed point of the mapping defined by the right-hand side of (1.1).
In this paper, we prove the existence of the Nash equilibrium for the MFG problem and the uniqueness of the associated value of the representative agent. To this aim, we use the relaxed solution approach, which converts the stochastic optimal stopping problem into a linear programming problem over a space of measures. The decision variable is no longer the optimal stopping time, but rather the distribution of the killed state process.
Introducing relaxed solutions facilitates existence proofs: the existence is proven by using Fan-Glicksberg's fixed-point theorem. The relaxed solutions are related to the mixed strategies introduced in Bertucci (2017) , and we establish a rigorous relation between the two. Finally, we propose an implementable numerical scheme for computing the Nash equilibrium in the case of potential games, and show its convergence. An application of these results to a resource-sharing problem will be developed in a companion paper.
MFG theory has been introduced by P.-L. Lions and J.-M. Lasry in a series of papers (Lasry & Lions 2006a , Lasry & Lions 2006b , Lasry & Lions 2007 using an analytic approach and studied independently at about the same time by Huang, Malhamé, Caines et al. (2006) . Later on, a probabilistic approach has been developed in a series of papers by Carmona, Delarue, and their co-authors , Carmona & Delarue 2018 , Carmona, Delarue, Lacker et al. 2016 , Lacker 2015 and so on.
The analytic method consists in finding the Nash equilibria through a coupled system of nonlinear partial differential equations: a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (backward in time), which describes the optimal control problem of the representative agent when the distribution µ is given, and a Kolmogorov-type equation (forward in time) which describes the evolution of the density under the optimal control. In the probabilistic approach, the system of PDEs is replaced by a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations of McKean-Vlasov type.
MFGs of optimal stopping have been considered in the literature only very recently, and our understanding of this type of games remains limited. Nutz (2018) considers a MFG problem where the agents interact through the proportion of players that have already stopped and each agent solves a specific optimal stopping problem of the form
There, the process r creates an incentive for the agent to stay in the game, while the possibility of default at a random time θ creates an incentive to leave. The distribution of θ depends on the proportion ρ t of players who have already stopped in such a way that the departure of other agents creates an incentive for the agent under consideration to leave as well. In a similar spirit but with greater generality, Carmona, Delarue & Lacker (2017) consider MFGs of timing, whose formulation is motivated by a dynamic model of bank run in a continuous time setting. As in Nutz (2018) , the payoff of each agent depends on the proportion of players who have already stopped, and the departure of players creates an additional incentive for the players still in the game to leave as well. Both papers (Nutz (2018) and Carmona et al. (2017) ) adopt a purely probabilistic approach.
In contrast to these two references, Bertucci (2017) studies a MFG of optimal stopping, which is similar to the one considered in this paper, i.e. where the interaction takes place through the density of states of agents remaining in the game, rather than the proportion of players that have already stopped. In this reference and in our paper, the departure of players creates an incentive for the players still in the game to stay, a type of behavior which is characteristic of resource-sharing problems. In Bertucci (2017) the state process has constant coefficients and evolves in a bounded domain, and the MFG of optimal stopping is solved through a coupled system of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman variational inequality and a Fokker-Planck equation.
Bertucci (2017) makes a number of significant contributions to the literature. In particular, he provides an example of non-existence of Nash equilibrium with pure strategies in optimal stopping MFG, and introduces the notion of mixed strategies in this context, for which existence may be recovered. However, the existence proofs in this paper are not fully clear to us.
1 To clarify the existence question and solve the MFG of optimal stopping problem in greater generality (with variable coefficients and in unbounded domains), we adopt, in this paper, a completely different approach, based on the relaxed solution technique.
The approach of relaxed solutions/controls is a relatively popular method of compactification of stochastic control problems to establish existence of solutions, which comes in several different flavors. In, e.g., El Karoui, Huu Nguyen & Jeanblanc-Picqué (1987) and a number of other papers, the authors reformulate the control problem as a relaxed controlled martingale problem. A similar approach is used by Lacker (2015) in the context of (standard) MFG. In the second approach, especially popular for infinite-horizon and ergodic control problems, the control problem is reformulated as a linear programming problem on the space of measures, and one looks for the joint occupation density of the state process and the control. We refer the reader to, e.g., Buckdahn, Goreac & Quincampoix (2011) and Stockbridge et al. (1990) , for a link between these two formulations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper which uses relaxed solutions in order to solve optimal stopping problems (both single-agent and of mean-field type).
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we present the model and give the mean-field formulation of the problem. In Section 3, we introduce the relaxed formulation of the single-agent optimal stopping problem and establish the existence of a relaxed solution. In Section 4, we study the relaxed optimal stopping problem in the MFG context and give conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium value. In Section 5, we establish the relation between the relaxed and strong formulation of both single-agent and MFG of optimal stopping problems. Finally, in Section 6, we present the numerical algorithm and provide convergence results.
The model
We fix a terminal time horizon T < ∞, and introduce a possibly unbounded open domain O ⊆ R on which the state processes of the agents will evolve. The space of bounded positive measures on O will be denoted by M(O), and the space of probability measures on O will be denoted by P(O).
Consider n agents whose states X i , i = 1, . . . , n follow the diffusion-type dynamics
where the Brownian motions W i , i = 1, . . . , n are independent and the coefficients µ and σ satisfy the following assumption.
1 To be precise, the weak convergence of the family m ε established in the proof of existence of a mixed solution in both stationary and parabolic cases (Theorems 1.6 for the stationary case and Theorem 2.1 for the parabolic case) is not sufficient to conclude that f (m ε )dm ε converges.
Assumption 1. The coefficients µ and σ are assumed to be Lipschitz continuous in the second variable, uniformly in t ∈ [0, T ] and bounded.
By classical results on SDEs, this assumption guarantees the existence of a strong solution to (2.1) satisfying sup
We denote by L the infinitesimal generator of this process
Each agent aims to determine the optimal stopping time τ i valued in [0, T ] by solving the optimal stopping problem
where ρ > 0 is a discount factor,f :
with τ a stopping time with respect to the filtration generated by the Brownian motions of all agents, and τ i O the exit time from the domain O of agent i. The assumptions onf will be specified later, and g is assumed to belong to C 1,2 ([0, T ] × O) and has derivatives of order 1 in t and of orders 1 and 2 in x of polynomial growth in x uniformly in t. Letting f (t, x, µ) = e −ρt (f (t, x, µ) − ρg(t, x) + ∂g ∂t + Lg), the optimal stopping problem becomes (up to a constant),
MFG formulation In the limit of a large number of agents, we expect, from the law of large numbers, that the empirical measure m n t converges to a deterministic limiting distribution m t for each t ∈ [0, T ]. The problem of each agent therefore consists in finding the optimal stopping time in the filtration generated by the individual noise of this agent only, and it is sufficient to work on a probability space supporting a single Brownian motion.
Let (Ω, F, P) be a probability space supporting a standard Brownian motion W . We denote by F W the natural filtration of W completed with the sets of measure zero. In the MFG formulation, the state of the representative agent with initial value x follows the dynamics dX
where we write X x · as a shorthand for X (0,x) · . As intimated in the introduction, the first step of the MFG approach consists in solving the following optimal stopping problem for the agent
where
is the exit time from the domain O of this agent with initial value x. Then, given the optimal stopping time (solution of the problem (2.2)) for the agent with initial condition x, τ m,x , and the initial measure m 0 ∈ P(O), the second step consists in finding the family of distributions (m t ) 0≤t≤T such that
In other words, the solution of the optimal stopping MFG problem is the family of measures (m t ) 0≤t≤T , which is the fixed point of the mapping defined by the right-hand side of (2.3).
In the sequel, such solution will be called a pure solution. As shown in Bertucci (2017) , pure solutions for optimal stopping MFG problems do not always exist, and for this reason in the sequel we shall consider relaxed solutions. A relaxed solution is close in spirit to the mixed solution introduced in Bertucci (2017) , precise relationship between the two notions will be established later in the paper.
3 Relaxed formulation of the single-agent optimal stopping problem
The relaxed formulation of the optimal stopping problem consists in finding the occupation measure of the representative agent rather than the stopping time. We first provide a relaxed formulation of the standard optimal stopping problem in this section and then move to the relaxed formulation of the MFG problem in the following one. First, we introduce the necessary notations. Let V be the space of families of positive bounded measures on O, (m t (·)) 0≤t≤T be such that: for every t ∈ [0, T ], m t is a positive bounded measure on O, for every A ∈ B(O), the mapping t → m t (A) is measurable, and
To each family m ∈ V , we associate a positive measure on [0, T ] × O defined by µ(dt, dx) := m t (dx) dt, and we endow V with the topology of weak convergence of the associated measures. Since weak convergence of probability measures is induced by the seminorms
for f bounded and continuous, the space V is locally convex.
Consider the optimal stopping problem
where f is a measurable function with polynomial growth in x, uniformly in t.
Definition 3.1 (Relaxed optimal stopping problem). For a given initial distribution m * 0 ∈ P(O), the relaxed formulation of the optimal stopping problem (3.1) consists in finding the family of measures (m * t ) 0≤t≤T , which maximizes the cost functional 
The rest of this section is devoted to the solution of the relaxed optimal stopping problem. A precise connection with the strong (classical) formulation of this problem will be established in Section 5. To gain some intuition about this definition right away, remark that for a stopping time τ ∈ T W ([0, T ]), we can introduce the occupation measure m
. Then the objective function of the optimal stopping problem writes
On the other hand, by Itô's formula, for a positive and regular test function u, one has
In Lemmas 3.2 and 3.4, we study the properties of the set A(m * 0 ). First note that this set is clearly nonempty since it contains the family m t (dx) ≡ 0. To proceed, we need a regularity assumption on the coefficients µ and σ. We distinguish two cases depending on the type of boundary of O.
Assumption 2. The coefficients µ and σ are such that for every
has a polynomial growth in x, uniformly in t, and such that one of the following two conditions holds: 
ii. Let g ∈ C 2 (O) such that g, g and g are bounded. Then, for m ∈ A(m * 0 ) and for every
Proof. Part i. Assume that f and g are C ∞ bounded positive functions, and let u be the solution of ∂u ∂t
Taking the expectation and using the equation satisfied by u and the fact that ∂u ∂x has polynomial growth yields
which means that u is an admissible test function. Substituting the above expression for u into the constraint, we have
Since f is arbitrary, this implies that
t-almost everywhere on [0, T ]. The result may be extended to a positive continuous function g with polynomial growth by approximation.
is bounded on [0, T ]. This implies that it is enough to prove the result for
, the derivative ψ may be approximated by smooth functions in the uniform norm.
By Itô formula, for s ≤ τ
Taking the expectation and integrating by parts we obtain
for some constant C < ∞, due to the bounds on g, its derivatives, and the coefficients of the SDE. Then we can define the function
which is an admissible test function by the same argument as the one used in the first part. This proves that
and since u(0, x) ≤ 2C ψ ∞ for all x ∈ O, we get the statement of the lemma.
Corollary 3.3. Under the assumptions of Lemma 3.2, let m * 0 ∈ P(O), and letm t (dx) be the distribution of the process X started with initial distribution m * 0 and killed at the first exit time from O. Then for every m ∈ A(m * 0 ), m t ≤m t , t-almost everywhere on [0, T ]. In particular, ifm t has a density then m t does as well.
Proof. Approximating the indicator function with a sequence of continuous bounded functions and using the dominated convergence theorem, the first part of the above lemma yields for all a, b ∈ O with a < b,
is the transition distribution of the process X killed at τ 
from which it is easy to see that φ A is twice continuously differentiable on its entire domain, and that the expressions φ A (x), xφ A (x), φ A (x) and x 2 φ A (x) are bounded on O by a constant independent from A. In addition, as A → ∞, φ A (x) converges in a monotone fashion to the limiting function φ * (x) = ln{1 + |x| 3 }. Now, consider the test function u A (t, x) = (T − t)φ A (x). It follows that
for m ∈ A(m * 0 ). From the boundedness of µ and σ and the above observations, we deduce that the expression within the brackets in the last term is bounded uniformly on A. The limits of the first two terms, on the other hand, are computed by monotone convergence. We conclude that there exists a constant C < ∞ such that 
Taking the test function u(t, x) = T t f (s)ds with f a positive continuous function, we have
We conclude that µ * is a bounded measure and the measure O µ * (dt, dx) on [0, T ] is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, which means that we can write µ * (dt, dx) = m * t (dx) dt for some m * ∈ A(m * 0 ). The following proposition is an existence result for the relaxed optimal stopping problem. 
wherem t is the distribution at time t of the process X started with initial distribution m * 0 .
ii. The function f is of the form
where n ≥ 1 and for each i, g i satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 3.2, part ii., andf i is bounded measurable.
Then there exists m * ∈ A(m * 0 ) which maximizes the functional
Proof. Choose a maximizing sequence of families of measures (m n ) n≥1 ⊆A(m * 0 ). By Lemma 3.4, it has a subsequence, also denoted by (m n ) n≥1 , which converges weakly to a limit m * ∈ A(m * 0 ). To show that m * is a maximizer of (3.2), we consider separately the two alternative assumptions of the proposition.
Let Assumption i. hold true. Fix ε > 0. By the continuity of f and the integrability assumption, there exists 0 ≤ M < ∞ such that
Then, by weak convergence and by Corollary 3.3, lim sup
Since ε is arbitrary, m n is a maximizing sequence and m * ∈ A(m * 0 ), this finishes the proof. Suppose now that Assumption ii. holds true instead. Without loss of generality it is enough to consider the case where n = 1, and we omit the index i. Consider the mapping 
as n → ∞.
Relaxed formulation of the optimal stopping MFG problem
We now give the definition of the Nash equilibrium for the relaxed MFG optimal stopping problem.
Definition 4.1. Given the initial distribution m * 0 , a family of measures m * ∈ A(m * 0 ) is a Nash equilibrium for the relaxed MFG optimal stopping problem (or "relaxed Nash equilibrium") if
for all m ∈ A(m * 0 ). In other words, the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the set of fixed points of the set-valued mapping Θ : A(m * 0 ) → P(A(m * 0 )), with P(A(m * 0 )) the family of sets over A(m * 0 ), defined by
which is well defined whenever the function (t, x) → f (t, x, m t ) satisfies the conditions of Proposition 3.5.
Theorem 4.2. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 be satisfied, let m * 0 ∈ P(O) satisfying (3.4), and let the reward function f be of the form
where, for each i, g i andḡ i satisfy the assumption of Lemma 3.2, part ii., andf i is bounded measurable and continuous with respect to its second argument. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium for the relaxed MFG problem.
Proof. We shall use the Fan-Glicksberg fixed-point theorem (Theorem 8.1.1 in McLennan (2018)). We have seen that V is a locally convex space; moreover, the subset A(m * 0 ) ⊆ V is compact (by Lemma 3.4 and since the topology of weak convergence is metrisable), convex and nonempty. The mapping Θ is clearly convex. Therefore, to prove that it has a fixed point it suffices to check that it is upper semicontinuous. In other words, we check that it has a closed graph (see Proposition 5.1.3 in McLennan (2018)), where the graph is defined by
To show that Gr(Θ) is closed it suffices to check that for any two sequences (m n ) n≥1 ⊆ A(m * 0 ) and (m n ) n≥1 ⊆ A(m * 0 ) which converge weakly to m ∈ A(m * 0 ) andm ∈ A(m * 0 ) respectively, and such that
for everym ∈ A(m * 0 ), we have
for everym ∈ A(m * 0 ). To prove this, it is enough to show that, up to taking a subsequence,
We will only show that (4.1) holds true, since the convergence given by (4.2) follows by the same arguments. It is enough to consider the case K = 1 and we drop the index i. We therefore need to prove
where we write g * m as a shorthand for O g(x)m(dx). As in the proof of Proposition 3.5, we may show thatḡ * m
. Similarly, we may show that g * m
Since f is continuous,f (t,ḡ * m n t ) g * m n t converges almost everywhere tof (t,ḡ * m t ) g * m t . Further, by Corollary 3.3, g * m n t is uniformly bounded, and (4.3) follows from the dominated convergence theorem.
Uniqueness of the Nash value for the relaxed MFG problem We prove here the uniqueness result of the Nash equilibrium value for the relaxed problem, which holds under the following assumption on the map f . 
t ) ≤ 0. Theorem 4.4 (Uniqueness of the Nash value). Let m * andm be two Nash equilibria for the relaxed problem and let Assumption 3 be satisfied. Then, f (t, g * m * t ) =f (t, g * m t ), almost everywhere on [0, T ], and in particular they lead to the same value of the relaxed fixed point problem, that is
Proof. Since m * is a Nash equilibrium, we get that
Sincem is also a Nash equilibrium, we obtain
From the two above inequalities, we derive that
The antimonotonicity property of the map f then implies that Potential games We now give an example where the search for MFG equilibrium reduces to the maximization of a functional.
Proposition 4.5. Let the reward function be of the form
where for each i,f i is bounded, measurable in t, and continuous and decreasing in the second argument, and g i satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 3.2, part ii. Then m * ∈ A(m * 0 ) is a Nash equilibrium of the relaxed optimal stopping problem if and only if
and for each i,
Proof. Assume that m * is a Nash equilibrium. By definition we then have
Sincef i is decreasing in the second argument,F i is concave in the second argument, and by concavity this implies that F (m * ) ≥ F (m). Conversely, assume that m * is a maximizer of F . For every α ∈ [0, 1] and every m ∈ A(m * 0 ), then,
Making α tend to 0 and using the dominated convergence theorem, we conclude that
5 Relation between the relaxed and the strong formulation of the single-agent optimal stopping and of the MFG problem
In this section we provide the relation between the relaxed and the strong formulation of the single-agent optimal stopping problem and of the MFG problem. We make here the following additional assumption. O has a distributionm t , which, for each t, has a square integrable density with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
ii. σ satisfies the uniform ellipticity condition.
Note that, by Corollary 3.3, we derive that m t admits a square integrable density with respect to the Lebesgue measure, for each m ∈ A(m * 0 ) and for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ].
Let W be a standard Brownian motion and X 0 be a random variable with distribution m * 0 , independent from W . We suppose that X 0 is valued in O and that m * 0 admits a square integrable density with respect to the Lebesgue measure. In the sequel, we denote by F the filtration given by We address first the case of the single-agent optimal stopping problem and we suppose that the instantaneous reward funtion f satisfies one of the assumptions of Proposition 3.5.
Theorem 5.1. [Single-Agent optimal stopping problem] Let v be the value function of the following optimal stopping problem
ii. Let x ∈ O and defineτ
iii. Letm be a maximizer of the map m ∈ A(m *
Proof. Part i. By Theorem 4.7, Chapter 3, in Bensoussan & Lions (1982) , the value function defined by (5.1) is the unique solution belonging to W 2,1,2 (Q), with Q := (0, T ) × O 2 , which satisfies the following variational inequality
2 The Sobolev space W 2,1,2 (Q) represents the set of functions u such that ∂ t u, ∂ x u, ∂ xx u ∈ L 2 (Q), where the derivatives are understood in the sense of distributions. 
Note that, by definition of the value function v, we haveτ
O ∧ T a.s. Taking now the expectation in (5.5), we derive that
Remark that the occupational measure associated with the diffusion process X · killed at the stopping timeτ
We now show the converse inequality. Fix m ∈ A(m * 0 ). Using a classical method of regularisation by convolution with a standard mollifier, with respect to both time and space (see, e.g., an extension of Meyers-Serrin's result -Theorem 3, p. 252, in Evans (1998) ), the value function v can be approximated by a sequence of functions
as n → ∞ and ∂ t ϕ n + Lϕ n is bounded. Since (ϕ n ) n≥1 are admissible test functions, they verify the constraint (3.3). Therefore, using the assumptions on m and passing to the limit, we derive that the value function v satisfies
From the above inequality, we derive that
Since v satisfies the variational inequality (5.3) and due to the positivity of m and Assumption 4, we get
Combining the two above relations and by arbitrariness of m ∈ A(m * 0 ), we get
Part ii. Since the stopping timeτ X 0 given by (5.6) is optimal for the stopping problem (5.4), we derive that Part iii. Let m * be defined in part ii. Since by the results above it is a maximizer, we have
where the last relation follows since v satisfies the variational inequality (5.3). Now, since − ∂v ∂t − Lv = 0 a.e. on {v = 0} and m * satisfies (5.9), we get
Using the above relation, the inequality (5.8) and the fact that f ≤ 0 a.e. on {v = 0}, we finally obtain that v=0 f (t, x)m t (dx)dt = 0, and
Let us now show that (5.10) implies that 
Up to an appropriate scale factor, one can assume that φ ≤ v. Suppose that
Subtracting (5.11) from (5.10), we obtain that
Since v − φ is a non-negative function belonging to W 2,1,2 (Q), we get a contradiction. This implies that for all non-negative
The result can be extended to an arbitrary C ∞ c function φ (which also takes negative values) such that supp φ ⊆ {(t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × O : v > 0}. Using appropriate scaling factors and similar arguments as above, one can show that
We now illustrate the relation between the relaxed and strong formulation of the optimization problem in the MFG context. We suppose that the instantaneous reward funtion f satisfies Assumption 3 with h ≡ 0.
Theorem 5.2. [MFG optimal stopping problem] Let m * be a Nash equilibrium of the relaxed MFG problem and let v be the value function of the optimal stopping problem
Proof. The proof follows by using the results obtained in Theorem 5.1 applied to the instantaneous reward function f (·, m * ) (which satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 3.5, part ii, so that Theorem 5.1 can be applied), together with the Nash equilibria property of m * .
Remark 5.3. It follows from the variational inequality that f ≤ 0 on {v = 0}. Therefore, if f = 0 on {v = 0}, {v=0} m * t (dx) dt = 0. Such a solution is called a pure solution in Bertucci (2017) , meaning that the agent will exit the game immediately upon entering the exercise region.
Fixed-point algorithm and convergence
We propose here a fixed-point algorithm for potential games. In this section, we use the notations of Proposition 4.5 and we suppose that Assumption 3 (with h ≡ 0) and Assumption 4, as well as the assumptions of Proposition 4.5 are in force. • Letm k ∈ A(m * 0 ) be such thatm
• Set k ← k + 1.
In the above algorithm, N represents the number of iterations. Now it remains to show thatρ is a maximizer of ρ → F (m + ρ(m * −m)). For each n, we have F (m n +ρ n (m n * − m n )) ≥ F (m n + ρ(m n * − m n )), for all ρ ∈ [0, 1], for all n. Taking the limit n → ∞ and using similar arguments as above, as well as the assumptions on F , we get f (m t )(m * t (dx) − m t (dx))dt = 0, which implies that m corresponds to a relaxed Nash equilibrium. If m * = m, the conclusion is clear.
We now give the following convergence result.
Theorem 6.2. The cluster points of the sequence (m n ) n≥1 generated by the previous algorithm belong to the set of relaxed Nash equilibria and the sequence (u n (0, x)) n≥1 converges for all x ∈ O toū(0, x), the value function of the obstacle problem associated with cost functional f (·,m), wherem is a relaxed Nash equilibrium.
Proof. First note that, by using the definition ofm n and Theorem 5.1 part ii., we get that m n ∈ arg max m ∈A(m * 0 )
f (m n t )m t (dx)dt. We thus have m n+1 ∈ C(m n ), for all n.
Let (m kn ) n≥1 be a sequence converging weakly to some m, and taking a subsequence again if necessary, we may also assume that m kn+1 converges to some Let us now prove the convergence of the sequence (u n (0, x)) n≥1 for all x ∈ O. Since all Nash equilibria m lead to the same value (see Theorem 4.4), we can definē u as being the solution of the obstacle problem associated with f (·,m), withm a Nash equilibrium.
Let u kn be a given subsequence. Up to subtracting a subsequence again, one can assume that m kn converges weakly to some m * ∈ A(m * 0 ), which, by the results above, is a relaxed Nash equilibrium. Using again the convergence in L 1 ([0, T ]) of g * m kn to g * m * , the assumptions on f together with Lebesgue Theorem, we get that the last term of the above inequality converges to 0. We can conclude that from every subsequence of u kn (0, x), we can extract a further subsequence which converges toū(0, x). The result follows.
